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NOTE AND COMMENT
POWER OF THE

u. s.

SUPREME COURT TO E'1FORCE JUDGMENTS AGAINST

STATEs.-In the year I460, when the perogatives of sovereignty or at least
of the Crown were asserted in England much more vigorously than they are
today, "the Counseill of the right high and mighty Prynce Richard Due of
York, brought into the Parliament Chambre a writyng conteignyng the
clayme and title of the right, that the seid Due pretended unto the Corones
of England and of Fraunce, and Lordship of Ireland, and the same writyng
delyvered to the Right Reverent Fader in God George Bishop of Excestre,
Chaunceller of England, desiryng hym that the same writyng myght be
opened to the Lordes Spirituelx and Temporelx assembled in this present
Parlement, and that the seid Due myght have brief and expedient answere
thereof." Whereupon the lords, apparently embarrassed by this extraordinary manifestation of confidence in them, declared "that the said writyng
shuld be radde and herd, not to be answered without the Kyngs commaundement, for so moche as the mater is so high, and of soo grete wyght
and poyse." \Vhen four days later the petition was again urgently presented "therupon incontynent all the seid Lordes Spirituelx and Temporelx
went to the Kyngs high presence, and therunto opened and declared the
seid mater, by the mouth of his said Chaunceller of England." The King was
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graciously pleased to command the lords that they should "serche for to
fynde in asmuch as in them was, all such thyngs as myght be objecte and
leyde ayenst the cleyme and title of the seid Due." And though the King's
command could scarcely be regarded as indicating a judicial inquiry, the
lords in their extremity "sent for the Kyngs Justices into the Parlement
Chambre, to have their avis and Counsell in this behalf, * * * * sadly
to take avisament therin, and to serche and fynde all such objections as
myght be leyde ayenst the same, in fortefying of the Kynges right." Duke
of York's Claim to the Crown, 5 Rot. Parl., 3i5, 1 vVambaugh's Cas. Const.
Law, I.
Four and one-half centuries later the "sovereign state" of Virginia sued
the "sovereign state" of West Virginia to recover a sum of money alleged
to be due upon the agreement of West Virginia to assume its proportionate share of the debt of the old state of Virginia. The suit was brought in
the Supreme Court of the United States, which after prolonged consideration rendered judgment for the plaintiff. No execution or other compulsory process was issued, however. But now after delays for various reasons and pretexts urged by West Virginia the court is compelled to face the
problem of what if any compulsory powers it may exercise to enforce the
judgment. In its opinion rendered April 22 of this year, the Supreme
Court, when confronted with task of compelling, as did Parliament and the
King's Justices of old, finds the matter apparently "too high." Virginia v.
West Virginia, U. S. Supreme Court No. 2 Original, Oct. Term, 1917.
No wonder the court is embarrassed. For the question is one which involves difficulties of theory and policy, and can scarcely be settled by legal
principles and rules alone. At least though the case would be clear if between private parties, must not the court consider whether the character
-0f the parties as well as circumstances may alter cases?
The latest move in this extraordinary litigation which has now been
before the Supreme Court eight times, is an application by Virginia for process in the nature of mandamus to compel the legislature of West Virginia
to exercise its power of taxation to raise money wherewith to pay the judgment, West Virginia having no property subject to execution, unless it be
that used for government purposes. There is no express qualification or
limitation of the grant of jurisdiction in "controversies between two or more
states" to the Supreme Court. Unquestionably a grant of "jurisdiction"
includes, in cases between private parties, power not only to adjudicate, but
to issue compulsory process to enforce orders, judgments and decrees.
Wa:>•man v. Southard, IO Wheat, I, 2, 3; Bank of U. S. v. Halstead, 10
Wheat, 57; Please v. Rathbun Jones Co., 228 Fed. 2i9; Knox Co. v Aspinwall,
24 How. 384. But the grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in controversies between states and that in cases between private parties is in the
same clause and in language identical in legal significance.
How then can it be claimed that the grant in the first class of cases,
is less complete and comprehensive than that in the second? West Virginia
answers that it is because, as a State, her governmental powers cannot be
controlled or limited. But this position rests upon a theory of complete
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sovereignty, and admittedly our states are not completely sovereign. Does
the power contended for fall within that portion of the state's sovereignty
reserved to it, or is it not rather by the very grant referred to within that
portion surrendered to the federal government. There is no express limitation upon this grant of jurisdiction, no modification of the universally conceded legal signification of the term jurisdiction, and none can be implied unless it be by appeal to the character of the parties. But it is singular that in
so important a matter as this, the Constitution should delegate power to the
federal government by employing, unqualified and unrestricted a legal term
of well defined meaning, if in fact it was intended to limit that power to less
than the usual significance of the term employed.
There is very little in the records of the constitutional convention or
other contemporary material, to throw light upon the question. Chief Justice \:VHITE's opinion deals very satisfactorily with this phase of the matter citing Elliott's Debates, and The Federalist, No. 81, as tending to show
that "jurisdiction" in its full legal significance was granted to the Court in
these controversies. The history of the particular clause of the Constitution
involved, may be traced in l Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention,
28, 244, 24i, 298; 2 ibid. 146, 147, 157, 173, 186, 425, 6o1.
The fact that during the colonial period differences between the Colonie-s
though determined by a committee of the Privy Council, were enforced
either by royal decree or legislation by Parliament is not persuasive, for our
entire governmental machinery under English rule was totally different
from that existing after the Declaration of Independence. For the omnicompetence of Parliament, there was substituted a distribution of powers,
in which the matter in dispute, seems to be definitely assigned to the Supreme Court. See Rliode Island v. l.fassaclmsetts, 12 Peters, 6Si, 739, et
seq. and historical authorities cited in the margin of the opinion in the
instant case.
Under the Articles of Confederation (Art. IX) disputes between the
states were to be determined by a special commission or court to be appointed in each case by consent if possible, if not by congress, and the judgment, which was to be "final and conclusive," was to be "transmitted to congress, and lodged among the acts of congr~ss for the security of the parties concerned." As was to be expected this bungling method was very
unsatisfactory in practice, and the dissatisfaction with the results obtained
and the significant omission under the Constitutional scheme of any provision for Congressional participation argue that the intention of the Fed. eral Convention was to give that complete power to the Supreme Court,
which the legal meaning of "jurisdiction" implies.
The case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, unquestionably lends
support to the West Virginia contention; but that case involved a phase
of the slavery question which was. already a cause of dangerous ferment,
and was decided by a court dominated by the extreme states' right theories of Taney, C. J., and four other appointees of President Jackson. From
a legal view-point the decision is an indefensible confession of judicial impotence, and while the case has never been overruled, it is perhaps signifi-
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cant that in the present opinion the Chief Justice does not so much as refer
to it. (See an article by \V. C. Coleman, 31 HARv. LAW Rsv., 210.) It must
be admitted that statesmen of our early constitutional period, including such
staunch nationalists as Hamilton expressed doubt occasionally as to the
power of the federal courts to enforce judgments (See The Federalist,
No. 81) but this never became the accepted view of the courts, except perhaps in the unfortunate line of cases just referred to. Over against them
must be set the unquestionable shift of the center of power toward the
nation, which economic conditions, the Civil War, and the Civil War amendments, have accomplished. It is idle to deny that constitutional law is made
in this way.
Finally we have a long line of cases beginning with New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. I, and running to Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S.-in
which the jurisdiction over controversies between states was freely exercised. It is true that as the states in all these cases voluntarily gave effect
to the judgments, compulsion was not required, but that very fact argues that
the court's judgments were regarded as more than mere arbitral pronouncements. In South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286, the court clearly
asserted its ability to enforce a money judgment against a state, a step,
however, which it became unnecessary to take because of subsequent developments. It should be noted, too, that four justices dissented, WHlTF.,
C. J., writing the dissenting opinion. But the latter's opinion in the present
case must be taken as greatly modifying, if not a rejection of, his former
view.
Moreover in Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, and many other cases
the Supreme Court has not hesitated to approve of the compulsion exercised
by the judicial power upon municipalities to enforce 'the levy of an authorized tax to pay judgments "rendered in consequence of a default in
paying the indebtedness." And while the difference between the municipal and the state legislatures must be recognized, never the less the former
as well as the latter exercises state governmental power.
While the step asked for by Virginia is opposed by many practical
difficulties, and is by no means fr~e of doubt as to the soundness of its
legal theory, yet on the whole the wording of the constitutional grant of
jurisdiction and the logic of the situation point strongly to the existence of
the power claimed. And this seems to be the view of the Court for it declares: "In so far as the duty to award that remedy is disputed merely because authority to enforce a judgment against a State may not affect state
power, the contention is adve•sely disposed of by what we have said."
The suggestion of the Chief Justice that Congress may have power to
enforce the obligation of West Virginia is interesting, but cannot be adequately discussed within the space here available. The basis for such proposed action is the constitutional requirement that agreements between states
can be given validity only through the consent of Congress, from which
flows a general supervisory power in Congress, which under the doctrine
of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, may be exercised by an appropriate legislation. There is much strength in this position, but in any proposed

NOTE AND COMMENT

621

legislation for this purpose, care would have to be exercised to avoid interfering with judicial functions, O!" impairing already vested rights. Perhaps a general law drawn to provide a method of enforcing judgments
against states, and confining itself to "remedy," would afford the solution.
H. M. B.
PRIVILEGE oF ENEMY ALIENS TC MAINTAIN Acr10Ns.-In his History and
Practice of Civil Actions, Lord Chief Baron Gilbert (p. 205) states that
alienage is a disability which must be pleaded to the action, "because it is
forfeited to the King, as a rep-isal for the damages committed by the Dominion in enmity with him. In l Hale's Pleas of the Crown, {p. 95) it is
said "That by the law of England debts and goods found in this realm belonging to alien enemies belong to the King, and may be seized by him,"
Y. B. 19 E 4. 6, is cited to that effect. The provisions of c. 30 of Magna
Charta clearly imply that such confiscation was appropriate under the
common law. In case the Crown neglected to seize the debts due the alien
enemy the creditor was, upon the termination of the state of war, entitled
to sue. Antoine v. J.f orshead, 6 Taunt. :237.
The severe rule of the common law was early broken into by the courts.
In Y. B., 32 Hen. 6, :23 (b) 5, it is indicated that if an enemy alien came into
England under the King's permission he could maintain an action in the
King's court for the tortious taking of goods from his house. And since
Wells v. Williams, l Ld. Raym. :282, I Lutw. 35, l Salk. 46, the law has
been considered as settled that an enemy alien within the realm by permission
could maintain actions, the necessities of trade and commerce having mollified the too rigorous rules of the old law and taught the world more humanity. Even a prisoner of war could maintain an action on a contract
for services as a sailor. Sparenburgh. v. Bam1atyn.e, I Bos. l Put. 163. At
least one judge, however, went on the ground that the plaintiff was no longer
an alien enemy. The enemy plaintiff must plead his permissive presence.
Sylvester's Case, 7 Mod. 150. The rule of pleading seems to have been
later settled otherwise. Casseres v. Bell, 8 T. R. 166, holding that the plea
must negative the facts which would enable the plaintiff to maintain the
action. Cf. Boulto1i v. Dobree, 2 Camp. 163. An enemy alien commorant
in the enemy country cannot maintain an action. Le Bret v. Papillon, 4
East 502.
The course of the English law was reviewed in a very learned opinion
by Lord Reading, C. J., in Porter v. Freudenberg, 1915, 1 K. B. 857,
where it was held that actions against enemy aliens whether resident or
commorant in the enemy country are unaffected. In Scha11ffenius v. Goldberg, 1916, I K. B., :284 it was held that a German subject interned in
England could prosecute an action in court. Judge Younger said: "There
has been a gradual and progressive modification in the rules of the old law
in their restraint and discouragement of aliens. It is, as I have already
indicated, not the nationality, but the residence and business domicil of the
plaintiff that are now all important. If these are in enemy country a plaintiff may not sue, whatever his nationality, even if he be a friend. If these
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are in friendly or neutral territory, he may sue, even if he be an enemy born.
Prima facie all persons resident in this country are entitled to have access
to the Courts, and, although it may still be that an alien enemy plaintiff
resident here must also show that he is here with the license, actual or implied, of the King, still even so, as has been held by Sargant, J., in Princess
Thurn and Ta~is v. Moflitt, (1915), l Ch. 58, the registration which the
plaintiff has effected is sufficient evidence of such a license." Internment
was deemed no revocation of the licence.
, The view expressed by Judge Younger that if the residence and business
domicil of the plaintiff are in a friendly or neutral country the courts are
open to him, does not seem to be settled by authoritative rulings. To allow
a subject of an enemy country so domiciled to use the processes of the
court would seem to open the door to assistance to the enemy, for the only
prevention of communication between such plaintiff and his home country
would be the more or less uncertain control of the sea and other means
of travel. See the opinion of Yeates, J., in Russel v. Skipwith, 6 Binn. 241.
In support of the view expressed by Judge Younger may be cited the dictum of Lord Lindley in Janso1i v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd.
(1902) A. C. 484, 505, and the undisposed of case, In re Mary Duchess of
Sutherland, 31 T. L. R 248, 394- See, however, Van Uden v. Burrell, 1916,
s. c. 391.
The leading case in the United States is Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns 6g,
in which Chief Justice KENT stated the law essentially as indicated above.
The disability of alienage it is there laid down, is confined to two cases :
"(1) Where the right sued for was acquired in actual hostility; * * * *
(2) where the plaintiff, being an alien enemy, was resident in the enemy's
country." Recent New York cases announcing the same rule are Rothbarth,
et. al. v. Herzfield, 179 App. Div. 865; Arndt-Ober v. Metropolitan Opera
Co., (Apr. 5, 1918) 16g N. Y. Supp. 944Where there were several alien enemy plaintiffs some non-resident and
some resident it was held that the suit, which was indivisible in nature,
should be stayed during the continuance of the war. Speidel v. Barstow
Co., 243 Fed. 621. But in another case where there were two alien enemy
plaintiffs one resident and the other non-resident the suit being for restrictive relief only, it was held that no stay would be granted, the court largely
relying upon the now generally discredited statement of the President that
the war was with the German government not the German people. Posselt
v. D'Espard, 87 N. J. Eq. 571. If the defendant had been able to show
that the non-resident plaintiff was the Kaiser or a member of his General
Staff perhaps the conclusion might have been otherwise. As to the situation where the plaintiff is a corporation organized in this country but really
owned and controlled by non-resident alien enemies, see Fritz Schulz Jr.
Co. v. Raimes & Co., 166 N. Y. S. 567, 16 MICH. L. REv. 45. Cf. Daimler
Co. v. C01itinental Tyre and Rubber Co. (1916) 2 A. C. 307.
It is perhaps unnecessary to state that the class of aliens that may be
permitted to resort to the courts may be enlarged or cut down by the legislative body.
R W. A.

NOTE AND COMMENT
Pow.ER oF THt STATr: To Rr:QUIRt WoRK ON RoAns.-That a state has
inherent power to require every able-bodied man within its jurisdiction to
labor on public roads near his residence without direct compensation, has
been well established by custom and precedent, but whether a state is justified in exacting a contribution of property for public service on the roads
is a question which has only recently come before the courts. In Galoway v.
State, (Tenn., 1918), 202 S. W. 76, a statute requiring any person' who
owned a wagon and team to contribute the same for road work for a few
days, and also to provide the necessary feed for each team, was held constitutional as regards the furnishing of the wagon and team, but unconstitutional as regards the requisition of the feed. In the only other case to be
found directly involving the compulsory use in road work of animals and
implements, the court arrived at a conclusion directly in conflict with that
reached in Galoway v. State. See T-0011e v. State, 178 Ala. 70; 42 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1045.
From the Colonial days to the present time conscripted labor has been
much relied on for the construction and maintenance of roads, and legislation to that end has been upheld almost without question. Butler v. Perry,
240 U. S. 328; 36 Sup. Ct. 258; 6o L. Ed. 672; CooLtY, T ..\XATION, n28.
The right of a state to enact and enforce such legislation has been considered as referable either to the power of taxation or to the police power. The
correct view would seem to be that, although the burden assumes the form
of labor, it is, nevertheless, in its essential nature, taxation, and it must be
levied on some principle of uniformity. Short v. State, 80 Md. 392; Galloway v. Tavares, 37 Fla. 58; Hassett v. Walls, 9 Nev. 387. Cases may be
found which are apparently in conflict with the above view, the courts
treating the requisition of labor as a regulation imposed under the police
power similar in character to military service and jury duty, but in most
of these cases the court could have called the burden taxation without impairing their decision in any way, simply holding that the work required
was not a tax of the particular kind prohibited by the Constitution. Thus
in Pleasant v. Kost, 29 Ill. 490, it was held that the assessment of labor was
not a tax within the constitutional provision declaring that taxes levied for
corporate purposes shall be uniform as to persons and property within the
limits of such body; in J ohnso1i v. J.faeon, 62 Ga. 645, that it is not a poll
ta.v;: within the constitutional provision relating to poll ta.xes; in State v.
Sharp, 125 N. C. 628; 34 S. E. 264; 74 Am. St. Rep. 663, that working the
roads is not a tax within the meaning of a constitutional provision requiring taxes to be levied ad valorem on property. See also State v. Wheeler,
141 N. C. 773, 53 S. E. 358, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) n39 and note.
These statutes requiring labor on the roads usually provide that the
laborers should bring with them such tools and implements as the overseer
should request. The North Carolina statute is typical of this general class
of statutes. See Sec. 2720, Revisal of 1905· It appears that during the early
history of this country while slaves were regarded as property, statutes
often required owners to send their slaves to work the roads. Galoway v.
State, S11pra, Toone v. State, supra. In Blackstone's time the custom was
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prevalent of requiring the use of teams along with personal services.
BLACKSTON£, CoMMSN'l'AlUES, Bk. 1, p. 358. Thus, in whichever light we
view the conscription of wagons and teams, whether as a tax or as a duty
owed the state, the correctness of the decision in Galoway v. State, supra,
seems unquestionable. See also Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. (Mass.), 504,
28 Am. Dec. 259. The right to make compulsory use of timber, gravel and
other materials in road work, taken from land outside the limits of the
highway, must be distinguished from the requisition of tools and animals.
The former is purely an exercise of the power of eminent domain, an unequal burden falling upon those individuals whose property is taken, and
compensation must be made for the materials taken. Posey Township v.
Smour, 42 Ind. App. 58o. See note 42 L. R. A. (N. $.) 1045.
The court in Galoway v. State, supra, has attempted to draw a distinction between exacting a contribution of the services of the wagon and
horses and the appropriation of the feed, arguing that the former is merely
an impressment for temporary service while the latter leaves nothing to be
returned to the owner. The validity of this distinction is certainly open
to question. The state can require a man's labor or the use of his tools and
animals for a reasonable period, and this particular labor, and this particular use of his property during the period of service, are gone just as absolutely as any feed consumed by his horses. Further, if the burden imposed by the statute is considered in the nature of a tax, and it is submitted that it should be, there is absolutely no basis for declaring the appropriation of the feed unconstitutional. In the early days of our history,
commodities were commonly received in payment of taxes, and at the present time the legislature may require taxes to be paid in money, labor or any
other medium that it may see fit. William's Case, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 186,
255; Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71;
CooUY, TAXA'l'ION, p. 15.
J. w. T.

EFFtC'l'IVSNtsS OF ORAi CoN'l'RAC'l'S, Wl'l'HIN 'l'HS S'l'A'l'U'l'S OF FRAUDS.In Morris v. Baron and Co., (House of Lords, 1917), 87 L. J. R. (K. B.)
145, plaintiff and defendant had entered into a contract of sale and plaintiff,
as vendor, had delivered part of the goods agreed upon. Delivery of the
remainder would have been a condition precedent to any recovery by the
plaintiff. This contract, however, was followed by a second one, not in
writing, whereby plaintiff was absolved from delivering the rest of the
goods, but by which he agreed that he would deliver them if the defendant
should so request. Thereafter plaintiff brought this action for the "price"
of the goods delivered. The defendant set up, by way of counterclaim,
plaintiff's failure to deliver the rest of the goods as requested under the
second contract. The court held that the second contract, although not in
writing, absolved the plaintiff from having to deliver all the goods under
the first contract, and therefore allowed him to recover for the goods delivered, but that, because it was not in writing, the defendant could not
maintain his counterclaim for breach of it.

NOTE AND COMMENT
In Noble v. Ward, 35 L. J. Ex. 81, L. R. 2 Ex. 135, the defendant had
contracted to buy goods from the plaintiff and was sued for his refusal to
accept and pay for them. He defended on the ground that this contract had
been rescinded by a later oral one substituted for it. The court held that
because the second agreement did not conform to the requirements of sec. 17
of the statute of frauds it did not have the effect, as a matter of law, of
rescinding the first one. This case was interpreted in Morris v. Baron and
Co. as holding, at most, only that a variation by agreement not in writing
would not be recognized, and that it should have been left to the jury to
say whether the parties intended by their new oral contract to rescind the
prior written one. It was distingnished from the principal one on the
ground that the parties did intend by their second contract to rescind the
first one, and that such rescision would be effective even though not in writing.
There is much conflict in the decisions as to whether a contract within
the Statute of Frauds can be varied by oral agreement as to time of performance and kindred matters. Neppach v. Oregon, etc. R. R. 46 Ore. 374,
7 Ann. Cas. 1035, and cases there collected, (holding that the oral extension
of time will be recognized as valid when it has been acted upon, at least.)
Actual rescission of a contract by oral agreement is effective, even though
the contract itself be one within the Statute. Goman v. Salisbury, l Vern.
240; Proctor v. Thompson, 13 Abbott N. C. (N. Y.) 340. So also, although
the authority is scant, a contract in writing as required by the Statute can be
rescinded by the substitution of an oral contract, if the parties intend to
rescind thereby. Goss v. Lord Nugent, 5 B. and Ad. 58 (dictum); Gilbert v.
Hall, l L. J. Ch. 15 (at least in equity); Reed v. McGrew, 5 0. 376; Dearbom v. Cross, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 48. The court in the principal case evidently
treated the second contract as evidencing an intent to abrogate the original
contract.
The court also distinguished the principal case from Noble "'· Ward on
the ground that the statute under which that case was decided declared that
a contract not in conformity with it should not be "allowed to be good,"
while the Sale of Goods Act, which governed Morris v. Baron aiid Co.,
provided only that it should not "be enfo:rced by action." This at once
raises the question whether there is not an intent behind the Statutes broader
than their literal wording might imply. The preamble of the original Statute might lead one to suppose that its object was to do away with certain
oral contracts, "For prevention of many fraudulent practices which are
commonly endeavored to be upheld by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury." This is the view of the court in King v. Welcome, 5 Gray (Mass.)
41. The action was in quantum 111er11it for services rendered, and the defense was ·that they were rendered under an oral contract not to be performed within a year, which plaintiff had broken. Although the Massachusetts statute provided only th?-t no action should be brought on such a contrac.t, the court held that, "So far as it concerns the prevention of fraud
and perjury, the same objection lies to the parol contract, whether used for
the support of, or in defense to an action. The gist of the matter is, that,
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in a court of law and upon important interests, the party shall not avail
himself of a contract resting in words only, as to which the memories of
men are so imperfect, and the temptations to fraud and perjury so great."
"Looking at the mere letter of the statute, the suggestion is obvious, that
no action is brought upon this contract. * * * The difference, it is clear,
is not one of principle." Accordingly the use of the oral contract even in defense was denied. So also in Scotten v. Brown, 4 Har. (Del.) 324. it was
said, "The danger in this respect (false testimony) and the necessity of the
rule which the statute prescribes, are equally strong, whether the suit is
directly upon the contract, or the contract is sought to be proved incidentally and by way of defense." Acc., Bernier v. Cabot Mfg. Co., 71 Me. 5o6.
A vendee in possession under an oral contract of sale can not set up the
contract in defense· to an action of ejectment. Zeuske v. Zeuske, 55 Ore. 65,
Ann. Cas. 1912 A. 557, and cases there collected.
On the other hand, Biackstone's sole comment is that "The statute of
frauds and perjuries (was) a great and necessary security to private property." Co:i.n.r:ENTARn:S, Bk. 4, *p. 440. If protection to property was the motivating intent of the Statute a~d its true justification, the distinction based
on verbiage that is made in Morris v. Baron and Co. is eminently proper.
This is the view, undoubtedly, of most courts. The opinion in Gray v. Gray,
2 J. J. Marshall (Ky). 21, thus expresses it, "The letter of the statute of
frauds does not declare a parol contract for land void, it only refuses to
give a remedy for the enforcement or breach of such a contract; but the
contract itself may for the purpose of defense, be used as a shield to protect the defendant against unconscionable demands, and claims growing out
of the contract." In accord with this doctrine, it is generally held that
in a suit on the common counts a contract may be used in defense, even
though it does not accord with the Statute. Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt.
383; Weber v. Weber, (Ky.), 76 S. W. 507; Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal.
391; M~Kinney v. Harvie, 28 Minn. 18; Sims v. Hutchins, 8 S. & M. (Miss.)
328; Schechinger v. Gault, 35 Okla. 416, (even though the Statute declares
it "invalid").
This is not usually the rule, however, where the statute says that such a
.i:ontract is "void." Donaldson's Admr; v. Waters' Admr. 30 Ala. 175; Nelson v. Shelby Mfg. Co., g6 Ala. 515; Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418; Lemon
v. Randall, 124 Mich. 687; Salb v. Campbell, 65 Wis. 405. Neither is it the
rule when the defendant is himself in default under the contract. In such
cases, however, the inadmissability of the contract is not due to the Statute
but because the defendant's acts have rescinded it. Jackson v. Stearns, 58
Ore. 57; Booker v. Wolf, 195 Ill. 365; Burlingame v. Bur{ingame, 7 Cow.
(N. Y.) 92; Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend. 204 (on the double ground that it had
been rescinded and that it was "void" under the N. Y. Statute); Cf. Jellison v. Jordan, 68 Me. 373 (apparently because of the Statute). In these
cases the recovery is allowed, of course, not for breach by the defendant
of the oral contract, but because of his implied promise arising out of unjust enrichment. Loss sustained by the plaintiff, not resulting in enrichment
of the defendant, can not be recovered. Gazzam v. Simpson, n4 Fed. 71;
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Dowling v. McKe1mes, 124 Mass. 478. It seems that contracts which do
not accord with the Statute may nevertheless have an effect in showing the
intent in an escrow. See supra, p. 569 ff. The fact that a contract is unenforceable because not in writing does not prevent its use to show value in
actions of quasi-contract, J.111rphy v. De Haan, u6 Iowa 61; co1itra, because "void" by statute, Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. II2; or to show the
amount of rent due, Evans v. Winona Lumber Co., 30 Minn. 515; Steele v.
Anheuser-Busch Assn., 57 Minn. 18; or to show damage resulting from
tort by a third party, Burruss v. Hines, 94 Va. 413; or that a settled claim
had a real basis, Michels v. West, 109 !IL App. 418; or to show reason for
money paid to defendant, Coughlin v. Knowles, 7 Met. (Mass.) 57. It is
unnecessary to cite authority to the effect that parties unconnected with a
contract can not collaterally attack it as "void." This is true even where
the defendant's liability results only from performance by plaintiff of a contract which could not have been enforced because of the Statute. Beal v.
Brown, 13 Allen (Mass.. ) II4. In suit for specific performance of a written contract to sell land the defendant was allowed to show that the plaintiff had orally contracted to re-sell the land to him. Frith v. Alliance Investment Co., 49 Can. Sup. Ct. 384, Ann. Cas. 1914 D. 458. It is also very
generally held that the Statute must be affirmatively pleaded as a defense,
since the contract gives a legal right until advantage is taken of the Statute.
Crane v. Powell, 139 N. Y. 379; Citty v. l11a1iufacturing Co., 93 Tenn. 276.
As to the interpretation of the Statute, therefore, a statement from Evans
v. Winona Lumber Co., S11pra, is applicable. "This rule may not be logical-very likely it is not, as an original proposition,; but that it is the rule
established by the authorities there can be no doubt."
J. B. W.

ScoPE OF THE DOCTRINE OF RYLANDS v. FLETCH£R.-A study of the doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. I Ex. 265, logically resolves itself into two considerations: first the theoretical merits of the rule, and second, its scope.
For a discussion of the first aspect of such an analysis, see 29 HAR.v. L. REV.
Sox; 2 CooLEY, ToRTS, n83-u87; B1GSLOW, ToRTS, 492. It is the purpose of
this note to consider the scope of this "doctrine of absolute liability'' as now
applied by the English Courts.
In Rylands v. Fletcher, D had constructed a reservoir on his land, the
water of which escaped, due to no negligence on his part, damaging P's
property. It was held that D was liable, on the theory that "the person
who brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do
mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he does not. do so
he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." In Charing Cross Electricity Suppl>• Co. v. Hydraulic Power Co. [1914], 3 K. B. Div. 772, this principle was extended
to apply where the defendant brings the dangerous agency upon land occupied by him under license.
However, an examination of all the important cases in point decided before 1917 indicates that the English Court-s have been careful to limit, rather
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than extend that doctrine. In Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. 10 Ex. 255, D had
constructed and maintained with reasonable care certain artificial embankments, which were over-flowed due to an unusual storm, causing damage
to P's property. The court held that P could not recover, asserting an exception to the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher where the damage is due to an act
of God, or vis major,-such as an extraordinary rainfall, which it is practically, though not physically, impossible to resist. Nugent v. Smith, I C. P.
Div. 423, 435-438, decided that a carrier might be protected from a loss
.occasioned by an act of God, if the loss could have been prevented by no
reasonable precaution, even though it was not absolutely impossible to prevent it. Cockburn, C. ]., said: "That a storm at sea is included in the term
'act of God' can admit of no doubt whatever." See also Forward v. Pittard, I T. R. 27, 33. Carstairs v. Taylor, 6 Ex. p. 216, semble, held that D
was not liable for damage consequent to the gnawing of a hole by rats in
D's water box, on the ground that such was a vis major.
A second limitation, where the damage is wrought by the act of a third
person, is propounded in Box v. Jubb, 4 Ex. Div. 76. P sued for damages
caused by the overflow of D's reservoir owing to the emptying therein of the
water from the reservoir of a third party. Held, that D was not liable, the
culpable act not being that of D, who was free from fault, but of a third
party. This principle was affirmed in Rickards v. Lothian, 38 A. C. 263, 277,
where the damage resulted fr om the stoppage of the drain to D's reservoir
by some third party, D being guilty of no negligence.
On the theory that the reason for the rule is one of social and economic expedience, as pointed out in the opinibn of Lords Cairns in Ryla1ids
v. Fletcher, many cases are held not to come within the reason, and hence
not within the operation of the rule. Thus, Smith v. Ke1irick, 7 C. B. 515, enunciated the doctrine that it is the right of each of the owners of adjoining
mines to work his own mine in the manner which he deems most beneficial
and convenient to himself, although the natural consequence may be that
some prejudice will accrue to the owner of the adjoining mine; so long as
such prejudice does not arise from the negligent or malicious conduct of
his neighbor. See also Wilson v. Waddell, 2 A. C. 95; Smith v. Fletcher, 9
Ex. 64 semble. But he has no right by pumping or otherwise to be an active
agent in sending water from his mine into an adjoining mine. Baird v.
Williamson, rs C. B. (N. S.) 376. In Blake v. Woolf, 2 Q. B. 426, the damage was caused by a leak in D's cistern, which was located on the floor above P.
Held, that D was not liable, it being a reasonable user for him to bring a
cistern on his .premises in the way he had done, and he being guilty of no
laches. According to the case of 1-Ving v. London General Omnibus Co.
[1909] 2 K. B. Div. 652, 666, in order for the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher to be applicable "it is for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has
committed a nuisance." On this ground the court held that P could not r~
cover for injuries due to the reasonably careful operation of an omnibus by
D, no evidence having been introduced to prove that the omnibus was so
dangerous as to constitute a nuisance. Where a public interest demands the
maintenance of a dangerous agency, such as a reservoir or water mains for
0
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the purpose of supplying the public with water, it is held that the defendant
is only liable when negligent. See the opinion of Bramwell, B., in Nichols
v. Marsland, supra; Green v. Chelsea Waterworks Co., 70 L. T. R. 547
(where the laying of the mains was authorized by an Act of Parliament);
Madras Railway Ca. v. Zemindar, 30 L. T. (N. S.) 770 (where the Indian
tanks in question had existed from time immemorial).
As the above cases indicate, the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher has been
limited and confined to such an extent that, in the words of Dean Thayer, 29
HARV. L. R.Ev. 801, "if the two rules of law, namely the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher and the rule prevailing where the case is rejected and the
defendant's liability depends on negligence, be compared in their practical result, the difference between the two in the actual protection given by the
law to the injured person is not very great." In speaking of the same
matter, Sir Frederick Pollock, in his book on the law of fraud in British
India, comments: "In every case of the kind which has been reported since
Rylands v. Fletcher, that is, during the last twenty-five years, there has
been a manifest inclination to discover something in the facts which took
the case out of the rule." But this apparent tendency to restrict and limit the
doctrine promulgated in that celebrated case seems not only to have been
checked and retracted, but to have been cast in the opposite direction. The
restriction now seems to have been attenuated to such an extent as to hold
the defendant liable where the damage is caused by an act of God. See the
decision of House of Lords in Corporaticm of Greenock v. Caledo11ian Railway Co., II7 L. T. 483, decided in Dec., 1917.
D, a municipal corporation, had constructed a pond on land acquired by
them for purposes of a public park, by the diversion of a stream through
enclosed culverts. Owing to a storm of unprecedented violence, the pond
overflowed, and a great volume of water, which would have been carried
off by the stream in its natural course, poured down and damaged P's
property. In an action by P to recover therefor, D pleaded that the extraordinary rainfall was a damnu111 fatale, or act of God, which they could
not have foreseen, and for the consequences of which they were not liable.
D admittedly was guilty of no negligence. Held, that P could recover; it
being considered that there was a duty on anyone who interferes with the
course of a stream to provide a substitute adequate to carry off the water
brought down by even extraordinary rainfalls, and he is liable for damage
resulting from the deficiency of the substitute which he has provided for
the natural channel. According to the reasoning of the court, such damage is not in the nature of dammim fatale, but is the direct result of obstructing a natural watercourse.
The decision in the principal case was based upon the adjudication in
Kerr v. Earl cf Orkney, 20 Sess. Cases 298. It was there held that P
could recover for damages sustained through the bursting of a dam, consequent upon a very excessive rainfall. But this holding is no authority to
sustain the position taken in the instant case, because there was an express
finding that D was negligent in the construction of the dam. See the findings by Sheriff in note on p. 300. The Lord Ordinary in his opinion said
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that "there is evidence in process that the same was in some respects insufficient and inadequate." And Lord Justice Ct,ERK observed: "In this
case the reclaimer cannot even plead great and unusual precautions. He
had not the advice of a skilled engineer. * * * He had no proper plans
formed by those competent to judge * * * etc." Furthermore, although
the flood was great, it was not unprecedented. Such a rainfall might have
been foreseen by ordinary prudence, for, as Lord Justice QERK (p. 302)
said, "an extraordinary fall of rain is a matter which in our climate cannot be called a damnum fatale." The words "in our climate" are significant.
It seems as if the principal case presented such facts that it clearly came
within the rule of Nichols v. Marsland, so that D should have been relieved
of liability on the ground that the damage was caused by an act of God. The
argument of Lord Wrenbury seems specious, that "assuming an act of God,
such as a flood, wholly unprecedented, the damage in such a case results not
from the act of God, but from the act of man in that he failed to provide
a channel sufficient to meet the contingency of the act of God." Such an argument has no bounds, for it is not inconceivable that every construction, no
matter how strong and durable, could be destroyed by some act of nature. According to this view, the fact that the damage was due to an act
of God would seem to afford no excuse or defense. It would seem, too,
that the interest of the public in the construction and maintenance of the
bathing beach would warrant the holding that this was a reasonable use of
the property, so that D would be liable only when he failed to exercise due
care. See Green v. Chelsea Waterworks Co., semble, supra.
For tbe condition of the American authorities in regard to the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher see the exhaustive article by Professor H. Bohlen, 59
u. OF p A. L. Rmr. 298, 373, 423.
c. L. K.

